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1 Bhavna Dave relies upon three different streams of scholarly enquiry (“the new Western
historiography of the Soviet era, the postcolonial theory and the ethnographies of post-
socialist  transition,”  p. 11)  in  order to  analyze  the  evolution  of  Kazakh  “national
consciousness”, as embedded in pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet power relations. The
question is explored principally in terms of the language policies adopted in the Soviet
and post-Soviet periods. In Dave’s words, “the crucial argument of the book is that the
depiction of  Soviet  rule in Kazakhstan and Central  Asia is  predominantly colonial  or
imperial,  and the portrayal  of  Central  Asians as  powerless  subjects  and recipients  of
Soviet modernity are both simplistic and inaccurate. […the book] details how the Soviet
socialist state, through a mix of coercive, paternalistic and egalitarian measures, forged a
distinct sense of ethnic entitlement among its nations or ‘subjects.’ A growing assertion of
ethnic entitlements went hand in hand with a steady depoliticization of ethnicity.” (p. 5)
2 The first part of the book relates the integration of Kazakhs in the Soviet system and their
participation in the elaboration of Soviet “categories and parameters” (p. 6), a process
which led to the formation of a “hybrid” Kazakh-Soviet “identity” (p. 5). The second part
explores the legacy of these categories in the post-Soviet period, in order to explain why
Kazakh  intellectuals,  the  political  elite  and  lower  social  strata  did  not  make  the
postcolonial quantum leap, freeing their “national” discourse from the Soviet categorial
cage. 
3 The first chapter is an accurate exposition of different historiographic interpretations of
Soviet  rule  in  Central  Asia.  Dave  provides  some  insightful  comparisons,  such  as  an
analysis of the differences between state-building and the imperial mission civilisatrice,
relying on Eugen Weber’s work on nineteenth-century France (p. 16-17). It is unfortunate
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that in the chapter that follows, which lays the historical foundations of Dave’s analysis,
factual errors abound. To cite only a few: in 1917 there was,  purportedly,  “a general
consensus  among  the  various  groups  of  Kazakh  intelligentsia,  Russian-educated
administrative  functionaries,  clan  leaders  and  ordinary  nomads  [!]  that  nomadic
pastoralism was  becoming  unsustainable  and  had  to  adapt  itself  to  new challenges”
(p. 46); the author seems to think that the main political divide during the civil war was
between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks (p. 42); she predates the forced collectivization of
agriculture to the period 1925-1929 (the assertion is repeated many times);  hojas are
referred to as “the clergy” (p. 32); the Turkestani and Kazakh Communist Turar Ryskulov
in 1922 supposedly “admitted that the Alash-Orda was the most legitimate representative
of Kazakh interests, and not a tribal-nationalist group as the Bolsheviks had maintained”
(p. 47) — at a time when Ryskulov was a high-ranking Bolshevik official in Turkestan’s
government.
4 Chapters 3 and 5, dedicated to language policies respectively in Soviet and post-Soviet
times, are the book’s best. In postfamine Soviet Kazakhstan, social promotion (which for
Kazakhs usually entailed urbanization) was directly linked to the mastery of the Russian
language, which often went hand in hand with a loss of proficiency in Kazakh. According
to one of Dave’s informants, Kazakh students at Alma-Ata University in the 1940s “did not
want to use Kazakh, not even among themselves, even though many of them did not
speak  good  Russian”  (p. 65).  Alma-Ata  and  the  majority  of  the  cities  in  Kazakhstan
remained largely Russian (in terms both of urban landscape and population) until the fall
of the Soviet Union. In the 1950s not a single Kazakh-language school was present in the
capital.  A  new societal  divide  between  urbanite  Russian-speaking  Kazakhs  and  rural
Kazakh-speakers was thus created. During the Soviet era, most Kazakh intellectuals were
Russian-speakers. In dealing with the language policies of post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Dave
makes  a  comparison  with  similar  policies  in  postcolonial  Asia  (Sri  Lanka,  India  and
Malaysia), and convincingly argues that Kazakhstan “has avoided potential social conflict
or politicization of the language issue by refraining from adopting a cultural or linguistic
transformation  agenda”  (p. 117).  In  other  words,  because  of  the  strong  linguistic
Russification of the Kazakh social and political elite, the state did not try to eradicate the
predominance of Russian, even though it promoted an increased use of Kazakh in the
administration and the media. Although Kazakh nationalist groups advocating stronger
support for the use of the Kazakh language have been present over the last twenty years,
“‘pure’  Kazakh  speakers  are  an  economically  and  socially  weak  group  that  cannot
mobilize  cultural  or  linguistic  claims without  state  support.”  (p. 112)  Therefore post-
Soviet Kazakhstan provides one of the clearest examples of “symbolic language politics,”
where language becomes a symbol of state independence and national assertion, while its
use  “in  the  public  domain or  in  interpersonal  settings  is  largely  unaffected.”  (p. 97)
However,  here Dave underestimates  the effects  of  post-Soviet  social  transformations,
such  as  the  urbanization  of  large  numbers  of  Kazakh-speakers,  and  their  access  to
institutions of higher education. 
5 Another  chapter  describes  the  construction  of  clientelist  networks  in  postwar
Kazakhstan,  showing the effectiveness  of  Soviet  priority  policies  for  jobs  and higher
education based on nationality in empowering a clientelist network managed by the top
echelons of the party of each national republic. In Kazakhstan the personification of this
system was Dinmukhammed Kunaev, at the head of Kazakhstan Communist Party almost
continuously from 1960 to 1986. The description of this “Brezhnevian political contract”
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is,  however,  quite  superficial,  given  the  difficulty  of  finding  documentation,  oral  or
written.  The assumed crucial  role of the clans derives from Ed Schatz’s and Kathleen
Collins’ works and it is not substantiated by original research.1
6 Dave  then  proceeds  to  explain  why  the  dog  of  nationalism  did  not  bark  in
demographically  Russian-dominated  Northern  Kazakhstan.  She  reminds  readers  that
“almost all ethnic mobilizations during the glasnost era and the post-Soviet period have
occurred via existing Soviet-created institutional channels” (p. 121).  Since Russians in
Kazakhstan lacked an ethnic territorial unit of their own, they also lacked administrative
tools and a local political elite capable of presenting their grievances. The vast majority of
them chose the “exit” option, and emigrated en masse during the 1990s from the newly
independent republic, ravaged by the dissolution of the Soviet economic system. Dave
reminds us that in Kazakhstan, as in other post-Soviet states, the legacy of the Soviet
system  largely  prevented  the  formation  of  ethnic  economic  niches.  Amy  Chua
notwithstanding,  no ethnic groups formed an entrepreneurial  diaspora in post-Soviet
states comparable to, say, the Chinese in Malaysia in the 1960s.
7 Dave’s analysis of the symbolic and pragmatic character of nationalizing policies in post-
Soviet Kazakhstan is careful but breaks little new ground. She makes some interesting
specific  points,  and  accurately  describes  the  power  balance  in  the  republic  between
different economic-political groups (even though the picture has now changed, after the
exile of  Nazarbaev’s  son-in-law Rakhat Aliev).  The overall  problem of  the book is  its
unresolved  methodological  ambiguity  between  anthropology,  history  and  political
science. The author claims that one of her main research efforts was the reconstruction
of family histories; and that she put together seven of them (p. 174-175). Unfortunately,
the reader does not see this potentially very interesting information in the text. Dave also
worked in  one archive  in  Kazakhstan (the  former  party  archive  in  Almaty),  but  she
provides references to only four files (dela) in the whole book (this documentation offers
some small pieces of attention-grabbing information about the situation in the education
system during the 1950s).  In her attempt to bring together the historiography of the
Soviet era, postcolonial theory, subaltern studies and ethnographies of post-socialism,
Dave falls victim to the fact that Kazakhstan has been marginal for all these disciplinary
approaches. The author’s tendency to take for granted bold assumptions made by single
authors (such as the late Nurbulat Masanov’s views on Kazakh nomadism), does not help
the search for new interpretations. Most importantly, after having convincingly pointed
out the radical differences between post-Soviet Kazakhstan and postcolonial South and
South-East  Asia,  Dave  somehow contradictorily  remains  stuck  in  postcolonial  studies
phraseology.  She supports a de-Russification of Kazakh “identity”,  since “a successful
postcolonial nationalist project rests on [in Partha Chatterjee’s words] ‘superseding the
conditions of colonial rule’” (p. 171). Dave believes that only a truly democratic society
with  an  open  public  sphere  where  different  conceptions  of  “national  identity”  and
“national  revival”  exist  will  be  able  to  prompt  this  “decolonization  of  the  national
imagination” (p. 171). She fails to explain, however, why, in a society where Kazakhs are
only half of the population, a democratic public sphere should be focused on the creation
of  a  “nationalist  project”  (p. 171).  One  is  left  to  wonder  whether  in  most  situations
becoming resigned to one’s own “hybrid identity” (in itself a problematic category of
analysis) would not be a better option.
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NOTES
1.  Edward Schatz,  Modern Clan Politics:  The  Power  of  “Blood”  in  Kazakhstan and Beyond,  Seattle-
London: University of Washington Press, 2004; Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition
in Central Asia, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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